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. 
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Third Party Defendants, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
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. PAUL H. TAYLOR, JOHN DOES I 
through IV, whose true names 
are unknown, agents of Jensen : 
Brothers Construction Company, 
a corporation, 
Third Party Defendants, 
LEON HARWARD, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party Plain-
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court by plaintiff-appellant, Taylor National, Inc., herein-
after referred to as plaintiff, against defendant-respondent 
Jensen Brothers Construction Company, hereinafter referred 
to as defendant, to enforce the provisions of a standard 
Utah County Board of Realtors Single Resident Listing Form and 
Sales Agency Contract. The contract provided for a commission 
\ 
to plaintiff pursuant to sale of the property involved and 
for attorney's fees in the event of breach. Jesse R. Harrison 
and William Soule, d/b/a Value Realty, and Leon Harward and 
Judith A. Harward were joined as Third Party Defendan_ts, Third 
Party Plaintiffs and Counterclaimants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Taylor 
National, Inc., for commission in the amount of $8,400.00 
plus 6 percent (6%) interest to the date of judgment, but 
such judgment was limited in that plaintiff 1s right to 
execute on that judgment was indefinitely stayed, plaintiff 
was denied its statutory right of a lien on defendant's pro-
perty, and the trial court furthermore refused to enforce the 
attorney's fee provision of the parties' contract. The date 
of the judgment sought to be reviewed is April 15, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have this court rule that the trial 
judge had no power or a~thority to issue an in<lef inite stay 
-2-
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of execution, thus denying plaintiff its inherent right to 
pursue judgment, that the trial court could not deny plain-
tiff its statutory right of a judgment l.ien on defendant's 
property, and that the provision for attorney's fees contained 
in the parties' contract should be enforced. Plaintiff, there-
fore, respectfully requests that such portions of the lower 
court's judgment be stricken and that plaintiff ~ allowed imnediate 
execution on its judgment, granted a lien on defendant ,.s pro-
perty and be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 
its contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On approximately the 1st day of December, 1977, defen-
dant, Jensen Brothers Construction Company, a corporation 
with its principal place of business in Utah County, list~d 
with plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc., a corporation with 
its principal place of business in Utah ·County, certain real 
property for sale located at 1939 North 90 West, Orem, -µtah, 
in accordance with a listing agreement. In July 1977, the 
parties entered into a standard Utah County Board of Realtors 
Single Residence Listing Form and Sales Agency Contract 
which specified that plaintiff was to receive a c9Ifu~ission 
on the sale of said property, and provided for the award of 
attorney's fees in the event of a breach by either party. The 
portion of that contract providing for attorney's fees stated: 
(R. 80). 
In the case of the employment of an 
attorney io enforce any of the terms 
of this agreement, I agree to a 
reasonable attorney's fee and all 
costs of collection. 
-3-
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During the time such listing agreement was in ~ffect, 
but after substantial work and effort on the part of plain-
tiff to sell said property, defendant sold the property to 
one Leon Harward, for the price of $140,000.00. On the 
basis of the sale by defendant to Harward, plaintiff became 
entitled to commission of six percent (6%) of sale price, 
to-wit: $8,400.00. (R. 7). Demand was made upon defendant 
to pay said commission and defendant failed and refused to 
do so . (R. 8) . 
Plaintiff in its complaint asked for the sum of $8,400.00 
plus the legal rate of interest on such sum and reasonable 
attorney's fees, by the t~rms of the listing agreement. {R. 
8). Jesse R. Harrison and William J. Soule, d/b/a Value Realty, 
and Leon Harward and Judith A. Harward were joined as Third 
Party Defendants, Third Party Plaintiffs and Counterclaimants. 
Trial was held on December 12, 1979, before the Honorable· 
Judge J. Robert Bullock. At that time plaintiff's counsel, 
Jackson Howard, testified as to reasonable attorney's fees • 
. (R. 443). There were no objections to his testimony and, 
in fact, both parties stipulated that such amount was 
reasonable. (R. 446). On January 16, 1980, the trial 
court's original findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment were rendered. Plaintiff's objections to such 
findings, conclusions and judgment were filed on January 22, 
1980. The trial court's amended findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and judgment were rendered on April 15, 1980. 
(R. 151). In its amended judgment, the trial court stated: 
-4-
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(.R. 2 9 9) • 
Plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc., ·is 
entitled to a judgmept against defen-
dant Jensen Brothers Construction Com-
pany in the sum-of $8,400.00 plus 6% 
interest from· and after December 9, 
1977, to date of judgment, but limit~d 
in equity as follows: 
a. Execution thereon shorild 
not issue aga~nst Jensen Bro-
thers. Construction Cornp~ny and 
the same should not constitgte 
a lien on real property owned 
by Jensen Brothers Construction 
Company. 
b~ Plaintiff, Taylor National, 
Inc., acting in the name and ~n 
behalf of Jensen Brothers Con-
struction Company, should be 
entitled to pursue the judgment 
of Jensen Brothers Const~uction 
Company against third party 
defendants Leon Harward, Jesse 
R. Harrison and William J. Soule, 
d/b/a Value Realty and Continental 
Value Realty, for the benefit of 
plaintiff Taylor National, said 
plaintiff to apply the proceeds 
of any such recovery toward its 
judgment against defendant Jensen 
Brothers Construction Company. 
(Emphasis added.) The trial court al$o refused 
to award plaintiff attorney's fees as provided in the con-
tract between the parties. {R. 289). 
Plaintiff:objects to this judgment in its entirety on 
the grounds that the trial court had no authority to so limit 
its judgment, and on May 9, 1980, filed its notice of appeal. 
(.R. 312) • 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO POWER TO INDEFINITELY STAY 
PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO EXECUTE ON ITS JUDGMENT AND SUCH 
LIMITATION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE STRICKEN. 
The law in this State pertaining to the stay of executions 
is set forth in Rule 62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This rule states: 
Execution or other proceedings to 
· enforce a judgment may issue immediately 
upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such 
conditions for the security of the ad-
verse property as are proper, otherwise 
directs. 
An inunediate execution is proper, therefore, unless the 
court authorizes a temporary stay of execution. Nothing in 
this rule contemplates an indefinite stay of execution on 
the judgment entered before it and there is no authority in 
this State which could sustain the indefinite stay of execution 
entered in this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the 
prevailing party in an action has a right to execute on its 
judgment and that a court may·not refuse to· do so, or grant 
an indefinite injunction. Johnson v. Johnson, 544 P.2d 65 
(Utah 1975); Livermore v. Hodgkins, 54 Cal. 637, 638; 
Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1938). The Utah Supreme 
·court in Ketchum Col. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 
541 (1916), stated: 
In any matter of litigation or dispute 
of which the inferior court has juris-
diction and it has regularly proceeded. 
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to judgment and has jud~cially determined 
and declared the rights of the parties 
to the proceeding, then the cou~t may 
not. exercise its discretion with re~ard. to whether it viill or will ·not. en.force 
a judgrrient thus regularlyenterer;t. When 
the .Judgment is once entered. ana··under 
law is an enforceable judgment, the party 
in whose favor it is r~ndered has a · 
clear right to h~v~ the s~me enforced 
and· if anyone.tries·to interfere with 
that right it is also the clear duty of 
the court to enforce the judgment ..•• 
The court may not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously or for any reason except a suf-
ficient legal reason refuse to act when 
the fact is conceded that the ertforce-
ment or the enjoyment of the fruits of 
the judgment as the case may be, is 
denied. . . . To permit such a course 
would be tantamount to permitting a 
court to enter a judgment but thereafter 
deny its enforcement. . •• The law gives 
plaintiff the right to have· the j"udgrnent. 
enforced and impose~ the duty upon the 
court to enforce it and no discretion is 
vested in the court whether it will -
enforce the judgment or not. 
In People v. District Court, 46 Colo. 386, 104 P. -484 -(1Q09) 
the Colorado Supreme Court restated the same general rule: 
It is a mockery of justice to give one 
a judgment and then deny him the means 
of enforcement. Every court has the 
inherent power and authority and upon it 
rests the duty of enforcing its own 
judgments and decrees •.. were it other-
wise, judgment and decrees of course 
would be empty and meaningless things. 
It is the substantive right of a judgment creditor, 
therefore, to enforce collection of its judgment against any 
and all property of the debtor, and Rule 62(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, ·cannot be construed to authorize an 
indefinite stay of execution. In Jones v. District Court of 
City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 468, 312 P.2d 503 
-7-
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)~) 
(1957) the Colorado Supreme Court addressed this issue: 
No rule of procedure adopted by this 
court can be so construed as to cur-
tail, repeal or limit the substantive 
rights and liabilities created by acts 
of the legislature. This court has no 
such power. 
Only a temporary stay of execution is proper, there-
fore. In Conrad v. Medina, 47 A.2d 562 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. 
Col. 1946) the court stated that a trial judge was correct 
in holding that ~e had no power to order an indefinite stay: 
Courts have discretionary power to 
temporarily stay execution of their 
own judgments. The exercise of judi-
cial discretion, how.ever, must not be 
founded upon what an individual judge 
believes are abstract ideas of jus-
tice, but upon recognized legal or 
equitable principals. -The principal 
grounds for which stays have been 
allowed are the pending of a timely 
appeal or motion, material facts 
occurring subsequent to the judgment 
and antecedent facts showing fraud in 
the rendition of the judgment or want 
of jurisdiction apparent on the 
record. 
In Eaton v. Cleveland St. L. & K. C. Ry. Co. CC, 41 F. 
421, 422 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Mo. 1890) the court stated: 
While the power to temporarily stay 
execution on its judgment resides in 
every court, it must be conceded that 
it is a power that ought to be cau-
tiously exercised, in other words, it 
ought not to be arbitrarily used, nor 
should an execution be withheld because 
it is inconvenient for a judgment debtor 
to pay his debts. 
See also Sam Savin, Inc. v. Burdsal, 61 Ohio App. 539, 22 
N.E.2d 914 (1939}; ~utler Assoc. Inc. v. Merrill Trust Co., 
395 A.2d 453 (Me. 1978). 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is proper by analogy to consider Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 62(a) and its interpretation by federal courts~ 
Win~gar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205 
(1953) . The federal rule grants a 10 day automatic stay of 
execution, but after the ten day period has expired and 
before the filing of a notice of appeal, the district court 
is without power to stay an execution of a final decree. In 
United States v. One 1962 Ford Galaxy Sed~n, 41 F.R.·D. 156 
l (.S.D.N.Y. 1966) the government asserted that the solicitor 
general had not decided. whether to appeal o:r; not and argued 
that the court under its broad equity powers could stay 
execution until the government decided what it would do. 
Judge Tenney, however, ruled that the court had no power to 
grant a stay longer than the automatic ten day pe.riod· 
provided for in the rule. 
It is clear, therefore,- that a district court has no 
power to grant an indefinite stay of execution, and that it 
is an inherent right in the prevailing party to execute on a 
judgment. In the case at bar, however, the trial judge 
stated that plaintiff, Taylor National, Inc.,·was entitled 
to a judgment against defendant Jensen Brothers Construction 
Company for the sum of $8,400.00, plus 6% interest from and 
after December 9, 1977, except that it is inequitable for 
plaintiff to execute against Jensen Brothers Construction 
Company or o·therwise take liens or encumber Jensen Brothers 
Construction Company assets as a result of any judcjment in 
favor of plaintiff. (R. 290) • '!'his jud.gment is clearly 
-9-
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contrary to the established authority in this state and is 
devoid of meaning since it constitutes a total inconsistency. 
Plaintiff has a legal right to judgment and the trial court 
had no authority to invoke some vague equity power in an 
attempt to exercise control over the legal right of execution 
obtained by the plaintiff. 
The court itself was confused as to whether it could 
rightfully issue an indefinite stay of execution, as evidenced 
by the Honorable' Judge Bullock's statements. During the 
course of oral arguments following plaintiff's objection to 
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, plain-
tiff's counsel, Jackson Howard addressed the Court: 
(R. 816, 
The 
right to 
court or 
(R ~ 8 25) • 
stated: 
MR. HOWARD: •.• if we have a right 
to judgment that is a legal right. 
Equity does not have any control over 
a legal right that is obtained . 
you can't deprive us of our rights 
under the law without due process. 
That is unconstitutional. 
THE COURT: That may be. 
" MR. HOWARD: "l 7 • · The court finds • • • 
THE COURT: "I worry about that one." 
817) • (Emphasis added.) 
trial court was confused as to whether 
execute was to be stayed until further 
indefinitely. The judge first stated: 
THE COURT: But you are restrained and 
enjoined from levying execution until 
further order of the court. And that 
is going to stay. 
plaintiff's 
order of the.· 
(Emphasis added.) Thereafter, however, the judge 
-10-
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THE COURT: What about this., "application · 
for further order of the court as herein 
provided"? Why did I.do that: 11plaintiff, 
Taylor National, Inc. should be and is 
restrained and enjoined from levying 
execution upon its judgment unti~ fur-
ther order of the court." ... What 
did I have in mind? I can't remember. 
(R. 825). (Emphasis added.) Thereafter the judge struck from 
the record the phrase, "until further order of the court", 
making the indef ininte stay of execution even more ambiguous 
and vq.gue. 
Moreover, the trial judge reiterated that he was unsure 
of his power to issue an indefininte stay of execution: 
(R. 834). 
THE COURT: ••• I int~nded it to be a 
judgment with no strings on it whatsoever, 
except when I got to paragraph 4; and I 
said in paragraph 4 that it would, that 
they are restrained and enjoined. And 
I do~'t know whether I have got ~ha~ 
pow~r or not. But, nevertheless, I did, 
restrained and enjoined from levying 
execution on the judgment . . . and 
that bothers me. Because I_realiy-don't 
know if I have the power to give a Judg-
ment and restrain them on execution on 
an equitable basis. 
The lower court, therefore, realized that it was without 
power to deny plaintiff its right to execute upon its judgment 
obtained .against defendant. Such an indefinite restriction 
totally emasculates the judgment which plaintiff obtained 
against defendant. As such, these provisions render the 
judgment obtained by plaintiff useless, and are contrary to 
established precedent and public policy o~ this State. 
Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully requests that the portion 
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of the trial court's judgment 4enying it the right to 
execute on its judgment be stricken. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY PREVENTED JUDGf.lENT FROM 
OPERATING AS A LIEN ON DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
The law pertaining to judgment liens is set forth in 
U.C.A. 78-22-1, which unconditionally creates a judgment 
lien in favor of, the prevailing party as against the real 
property of defendant. This section states: 
From the time the judgment is docketed 
it becomes a. lien upon· all· the real 
property of the Judgment debtor, not 
exempt from execution, in the county 
in which the judgment is entered, 
owned by him at the time or by him 
thereafter acquired during the exis-
tence of said lien. A transcript of 
judgment rendered in a district court 
of this state, in any county thereof, 
may be filed and docketed in the 
off ice of the clerk of the district 
court of any county, and when so 
filed and docketed it shall have, 
for purposes of lien and enforcement, 
the same force and effect as a judg-
ment entered in the district court 
in such county. The lien shall con-
tinue for eight years unless the 
judgment is previously satisfied or 
unless the enforcement of the judgment 
is stayed on appeal by the execution 
of a sufficient undertaking as provided 
by law, in which case the lien of the 
judgment ceases. 
Until the lien expires, therefore, the creditor is 
statutorily guaranteed a lien on the unexempt property of 
the debtor, existing at the time of the judgment or acquired 
thereafter. The Utah Supreme Court and the majority of 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
states with similar statutes have unconditionally ripheld 
this legal principle. Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah2d 3~1, 302 
P.2d. 273 (1956); Belnap v. Blaine, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978); 
Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah2d 39, 402 P.2d 696, 698 {1965); 
Utah Co-Op Ass'n v. White Dist. and Supply Co., 120 Utah 
603, 237 P.2d 262, cause remanded to Utah2d 391, 275 P.2d 
687 (1954); Webster v. Roderick, 64 Wash.2d 814, 394 P.2d 
689 (1964); Jones v. St. Francis Hospital and· School of 
• 
Nursing, Inc., 225 Kan. 649, 594 P.2d 162 (1979). 
The same courts have held that such judgments liens are 
of a purely legal character and courts are not given the 
equitable power to expand or alter the judgment lien so as 
to make exceptions or qualifications for a particular case. 
Davidson v. Root, 11 Ohio 98; Boyle v. Bagg, 10 Utah2d 203, 
350 P.2d 622 (1960); Conrad v. Everich, 50 Ohio St. 476, 35 
N.E. 58 {1893); Savings and L. Co~p. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 
154 S.E. 587 {1930); Federal Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Walker, 
115 Utah 461, 206 P.2d 146 (1949) ;- Ha·rris v. Southwest Bank, 
133 Okla. 152, 271 P. 683 (1928). · Even a temporary stay of 
execution or an injunction against enforcement does not 
necessarily result in the destruction of a lien predicated 
upon the judgment. Cook v. Martin, 75 Ark. 40, 87 s.w. 625 
(1905); 46 Anl.Jur.2d 518, Judgments, §325. 
It has been clearly established, therefore, both by 
case law and statutory authority, that it is not within the 
trial court's discretion to blatantly disregard the statu-
torially granted lien on a judgment debtor's property •. In 
the case at bar, however, the trial cou~t ~ran~PA nl~;n+-;.f=~ 
.. "':: .. · - ... 
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·a judgment in the amount of commission due against defend~nt 
Jensen Brothers Construction Company (R. 299}, but indefinitely 
estopped plaintiff from pursuing such judgment and held that 
said Judgment "should not constitute a lien on real property 
owned by Jensen Brothers Construction Company. (R. 299}. 
Such a judgment is clearly erroneous since U.C.A. 78-22-1 
cannot be abrogated by the action of the lower court. The 
court had no authority to make such a judgment since, by the 
operation of this statute, when the court's judgment was 
docketed in this action on June 26, 1980, a lien automatically 
arose upon all the real property owned by defendant Jensen 
Brothers Construction Company. By the very terms of the 
statute the lien arose and there is no authority in this 
state which would allow the trial court to abrogate the 
existence or effectiveness of such a lieri. The judgment of 
the lower court purports to do so, however, and the nature 
of its restriction is to prevent any lien upon the property 
of the defendant from arising as an incident to the judgment 
rendered. Such restrictions are clearly contrary to §78-22-1 
and established precedent, and the plaintiff, therefore, 
respectfully requests that such a decision by the trial 
court be stricken and reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ·WRONGFULLY REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE PROVISION INCLUDED IN THE. PARTIES' CONTRACT. 
In a law case, such as the case at bar, attorney's fees 
are properly awarded when an agreement or contract between 
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the parties so provides. Biesinger v. B~hunin, 584_ P.2d 801 
(Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert., 567 P.2d 168 {Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Biesinger v. Behunin, supra, 
stated that a lower court erred in not awarding attorney's 
fees where there was a provision providing for such in the 
contract and where a sworn statement signed by the plain-
tiff's attorney was admitted into evidence along with direct 
testimony which clearly set forth the number of hours spent 
on the case and the attorney'·s hourly rate. Since this 
evidence remained uncontested by defendant, the· Court stated 
that the judgment should properly have included attorney's 
fees. 
Reasonable attorney's fees, therefore, should be 
allowed when the contract between the parties so provides, 
and SUGh provisions should be given a broad rather than 
narrow or restrictive m~aning. Kaffi!~ert Bros. Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 428 P.2d 678 
(1967); Colvin v. Superior Equ. C~., 96 Ariz. 113, 392 P~2d 
778 (1964); Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 86 Ariz. 288, 345 
P.2d 210 (1959); Leventf1al v. Krinsky., 325 Mass. 336, 90 
N.E.2d 545 (1950); Fenn~r & Shea Const. Co. v. Wadkins, 32 
Colo. App. 364, 511 P.2d 924 (1973); Zambruk v. Perlmutter 
3rd Generation Builders, Inc., 32 Colo. App. 276, 510 P.2d 
472 (1973) . 
The general rule, therefore, is that a provision in a 
contract or stipulation for the award of attorney's fees in 
the event of breach is valid; it is regarded as a reasonable 
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provision for reimbursement or indemnity to the creditor. 
For an extensive list of cases supporting this principal see 
17 Am.Jur.2d 517 §164. These cases indicate that before 
enforLernent of the provision will be allowed, certain facts 
must be established. The cases are not uniform as to what 
precise facts must be shown, but it is deducible from the 
decisions that a showing must be made as to one or more of 
the following: (1) that the fee or expenses were actually 
paid or a liability to pay them was incurred, (2) that the 
stipulated amount is reasonable, and (3) the value of the 
serv·ices rendered by the creditors attorney in connection 
with the collection of the debt. See 41 A.L.R.2d 303 §9. 
As long as these general requirements are met, as they have 
been in the case at bar, a provision within the body of a 
contract to pay an attorney's fee is a valid and binding 
obligation, not to be ignored by the court. The Utah 
Supreme Court in McCormick v. Swen, 36 Utah 6, 102 P. 626 
(1909), stated: 
Prima facie the amount agreed upon should 
be assumed as the proper fee to be 
allowed and unless it is clearly obvious 
to the court or is made to appear that 
the amount stipulated for is unjust, 
oppressive, or unreasonable in view of 
all the circumstances of the case the 
stipulated amount should be allowed. 
A contract such as the one in the case at bar providing 
for ~ttorney's fees to the prevailing party in event of a 
breach, is analogous to U.C.A. §78-37-9 which provides for 
·attorney's fees in the event of breach or default in mortgage 
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foreclosure cases. In Mason v .. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 
P.2d 730 (1945), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In view of the court'$ conclusion of 
law that the plaintiff was entitled 
to and did, pursuant to the terms of 
the note and mortgage, declare the 
entire principal and interest inune-
diatly due and that she was legally 
entitled to thereupon foreclose this 
mortgage, the contract for a reason-
able attorney's fee in~the event of 
foreclosure must be recognized • 
it follows a·s a matter of course 
that the court must find what is a 
reason~ble attorney's fee and include 
such amount in its judgment. 
Mason, supra at 733. (Emphasis added). See also Jensen v. 
Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915); Kurtz v. ·ogden 
Canyon San. Co., 37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910). 
In the case at bar, the contract between the par.ties 
provided: 
(R. 80). 
In the case of the employment of an 
attorney to enforce any of the terms 
of this agreement, I agree to a reason-
able attorney's fee and all costs of 
collection. 
The trial court granted judgment to plaintiff, Taylor 
Nation·a1, Inc., but withheld reasonable attorney's fees. 
{R. 289). During the trial on December 12, 1979, plaintiff's 
counsel, Jackson Howard, presented direct testimony as to the 
amount of attorney's fees: 
MR. HOWARD: My name is Jackson Howard, 
I am a lawyer, I am licensed to practice 
in the State of Utah. I have been 
admitted to practice since June of 
1950. I have been employed by Taylor 
National Real Estate Company to repre-
sent them in this matter. To date I 
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have spent 13-1/4 hours in their case 
and clerks in my off ice have spent 
8-3/4 hours in this case. The Taylors 
have been billed for the services. I 
have rendered the sum of $918.75, and 
for the services by other people in 
the office $131.25, they have been 
billed costs and expenses on thereof 
$146.10; for a total fee and cost total 
of $1,050.00, plus $146.10. It is my 
judgment that the charges made are 
reasonable and that the costs expended 
were necessary in order to pursue their 
cause of action. I believe that the 
charges made are compatible with charges 
made by lawyers of similar experience 
under similar circumstances and similar 
cases. It is my estimate that it will 
take at least ten more hours to com-
plete the matters that are pending, 
including the time in court this day 
and reviewing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and judgment at some sub-
sequent date. That would indicate an 
additional amount of fee approximately 
$750.00. I am available for cross-
examination. 
THE COURT: Do you care to cross-
examine? 
MR. NORTON: I have one question. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NORTON: 
Q. The deposition of .Mr. Paul Tay-
lor is a part of your cost? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: What is it? What are the 
costs? 
MR. HOWARD: The costs are $146.10. 
The expenditures have been for filing 
fees with the county clerk's office, 
for service fees, for a variety of 
copies of the documents that w~ ~ave 
had to make, and for the depositions, 
the· costs of Mr. Roundy at $90.80. 
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THE COURT: $90.80? 
MR. HOWARD: $90.80. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
MR. NORTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Do you have any? 
MR. BRADFORD: No. 
THE COURT: Okay, you may· step 
down. 
MR. HOWARD: Your honor, I have sug-
gested ,to counsel that I have con-
tacted Mr. Ray Ivie, who said he 
would file an affidavit with the court 
here before co~cerning attorney's fees, 
and I would proffer that if he were 
called that the testimony that I have 
given concerning fees and that the 
fees stated are in fact reasonable, 
just and proper within the standards· 
applicable to lawyers who practice in 
Utah county. If you want me to call 
him, I will. But I.think he will just 
testify accordingly and I have his 
affidavit which I have heretofore filed. 
Would you stipulate that if he were 
called his testimony would be such? 
MR. BRADFORD: I would so stipulate. 
MR. NORTON: So stipulate. 
MR. HOWARD: Thank you, your honor. 
Plaintiff rests. 
(R. 443 I 444) • (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear and evident that no questions nor objections 
were raised as to Mr. Howard's testimony and that both 
parties stipulated that such fees were reasonable. 
Since attorney's fees were an integral part of the 
contract between the parties, the court may not rightly give 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and refuse to enforce the 
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provision regarding such fees. The parties all agreed and 
stipulated that the proof in respect to the fees was reasonable, 
the only question for the court to decide, therefore, was 
whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees. Since 
the provision regarding such fees existed, it was valid and 
binding and the attorney·'s fees, as a matter of right, were 
to be awarded to plaintiff. The court cannot change the 
contract and bar plaintiff from enforcing the original 
provisions. Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of its 
contract. Since the court granted judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and stated that it was entitled _to the commission 
which was the subject of the breach, it cannot deprive. 
plaintiff of the attorney's fee, a material part of that 
contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court is highly inconsistent 
in this matter. The trial judge purports to allow for the 
enforcement of the contract against a breach by the defendant, 
Jensen Brothers Construction Company, but at the same time 
in the name of "equity" purports to deny execution of that 
judgment, takes away plaintiff's statutorily guaranteed 
right of a lien on defendant's property, and denies enforce-
ment on the clause respecting attorney's fees. Plaintiff's 
action, however, ·is not an action in equity. An action to 
enforce a contract is an action at law, and the parties must 
be bound by the terms and provisions of their contract which 
are not against public policy or otherwise unenforceable in 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this state. The trial court was clearly against the esta-
blished weight of authority in holdin~ that· plaintiff be 
indetinitely enjoihed from executing on their judgment, and 
has no power to ignore U.C.A. §78-22-1 regarding judgment 
liens, nor does it have the authority to refuse enforcement 
of the attorney's fee prov_isions in its contract. Plaintiff 
therefore respectfully requests that these portions of the 
trial court's j.udgment be stricken and that plaintiff be 
~ 
allowed to execute on their judgment, be given their guaran-
teed l.ien against defendant's property, and be awarded a 
reasonabLe attorney's fee. 
DATED this LJ+A:z day of August, 1980. 
for: 
WARD, PETERSEN 
Attorneys_ for Plaintiff 
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